IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S OWN WITNESSNEW DEVELOPMENTS

THERE

MASON LADD*

is a need today for a critical examination of many of the
rules of evidence, with a view to their reformation. Here and
there a forward-looking judge or a courageous court makes a step
in advance; but the slow process of judicial reform is inadequate and a
resort to legislation is essential. Among the antiquated rules which have
been condemned by judges and lawyers is that which in general terms
prevents a party from impeaching his own witnesses. More specifically
stated, it prevents attack upon a party's witness by evidence tending to
show (I) bad character to discredit his general truth and veracity, (2) previous favorable statements inconsistent with the injurious testimony
given in the trial to expose the witness' capacity to err and to neutralize
the destructive testimony, (3) interest, corruption and bias to establish
motive of the witness to testify against the party calling him. Does this
rule deserve complete destruction? If so, why has it persisted? If not,
should it be preserved unchanged, or should it be modified? If the legislature should act, what action should it take?
ORIGIN AND HISTORY

The origin of the rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness is
not known with certainty. It is commonly believed to have its root in
trial by compurgation,' This mode of trial was in vogue during the Middle
Ages both on the continent and in England, where it became known as
trial by wager of law.2 A party, by taking oath, could establish his plea of
defense if compurgators swore that they believed he spoke the truth.3 As
the compurgators testified only to the verity of the party's oath, they
were little more than character witnesses. They were' selected by the
party himself from among his immediate kinsmen in early times and later
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from among his relatives, neighbors, and friends. With such wide range
for selection of his oath-helpers, no thought occurred that the party could
impeach them.4 Thus trial by compurgation set a pattern from which
it is possible that the impeachment rule might have developed. The proximity between these two systems of trial is some support for this view.
While it was not until the Fifteenth Century that witnesses in the modern
sense were used in jury trials, trial by wager of law still existed as a competing institution with the jury.5 It may be seriously questioned whether
the idea that a party cannot impeach his own witness came from either
the system of compurgation or from the decisory oath under the Roman
law, where the party who tendered oath became bound by the oath of his
adversary. Moreover, it is significant that none of the earlier cases mention compurgation or the decisory oath as the origin of the rule. Furthermore, the first cases stating the rule appear approximately a century after
trial by compurgation was abandoned in England. While the impeachment rule is consistent with the practice of trial upon oath, there was no
logical reason for the modern mode of litigation to adopt the practice because of the great differences between the two systems of trial. Jury trial
as it ultimately developed called for actual testimony as to facts which
necessarily precluded the free choice of witnesses. This distinction, together with the fact that the early cases make no mention whatever of the
early practice, indicate that any influence by way of compurgation operated indirectly and without deliberation.
A more probable origin of the rule can be found in the transition from
the inquisitorial method of trial as it gradually emerged into an adversary
system. Jury trial in the modern sense was the outgrowth of the institution of trial by inquisition in which there was no place for the rule that a
party could not impeach his own witnesses. Trial by inquest was brought
into England at the time of the Norman invasion. It became the parent
of the modern jury.6 Among the first acts of William the Conqueror was
the taking of a census of the people, lands, and conditions which was
42

Wigmore, op. cit. supranote i, at § 896.

5Id. at § 575. The defendant could refuse trial by jury in actions of detinue and debt and
be tried upon his oath with oath-helpers, during the 15th century. Thayer, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 17-24, 30-31.
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origin or a merger of both, is a matter much discussed by the historians. The Normans, however, gave it a definite place in their system of administering justice among the conquered
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trial. For conflicting theories- and the, authorities see Moschzisker, The Historic Origin of
Trial by Jury, 7o U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1-13 (1921).
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recorded in the "Doomsday Book." The method of obtaining the information for this record was through the verdicts of inquest sworn to by
selected persons of the neighborhood. Later Henry II at the Council of
Nobles held in Clarendon in 166, established a procedure, later known
as novel disseisin, to determine questions of seisin and disseisin of land.
Out of this procedure the system of inquisitorial trial became common
throughout England, extending to all matters of dispute in both civil and
criminal causes. This institution soon was accepted as a substitute for
earlier modes of trial by ordeal and by battle, and challenged the system
of compurgation. The jurors, or recognitors as they were first called, were
selected from those in the community who knew, of their own personal
knowledge, the facts in dispute. The recognitors, usually twelve in number, heard no evidence but proceeded to determine the cause by comparing their own previous information upon the facts. Later deed-witnesses
and transaction-witnesses were used in connection with jury trial. At
first they served as jurors themselves and when used in connection with
the inquisitorial jury, they did not testify but joined the jurors in their
deliberation, giving information to them. Later other witnesses were permitted to give testimony before the inquisitors who acted upon both their
personal knowledge and the information gained from the witnesses in
rendering a decision. This use of outside testimony was regarded as a radical innovation upon the former method of trial. The ordinary witness
could not be compelled to appear and was in fact discouraged in doing so.
There was a strong policy against fomenting litigation and the voluntary
witness was regarded as a meddler, and might become charged with maintenance. 7 While voluntary witnesses could be presented to the jury, it
was not until the time of Elizabeth that a party could compel the attendance of witnesses in civil cases' and the defendant in criminal cases did not
have this right until the last of the Seventeenth Century. 9 It was by a
gradual process that the system of litigation shifted from an inquisitorial
to an adversary character. Even as late as Bushell's case, in 1670, as
stated by Chief Justice Vaughan, the jurors were permitted to rely upon
their own information to nullify any testimony given in court.10 In this
latter stage, the jurors were both judges of evidence as well as witnesses
74 Wigmore, op. cit. supranote x, at § 29o.
8 Compulsory attendance of witnesses in civil cases was authorized in 1562. 5 EliZ. c. 9, §

12.

9 Twyn's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 5x3, 516 (1663); Turner's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 565, 57o

(1663); Reading's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 259, 278 (1679). See i Wigmore, op. cit. supranote i,
at § 575.
106 How. St. Tr. 999 (1670).
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and by gradual process, the system evolved whereby they became solely
judges of the evidence apart from any knowledge of their own. It was not
until the case of Rex v. Hutton," in which Lord Ellenborough declared that
a verdict should not be sustained when based upon the jurors' own
knowledge rather than evidence produced before them, that there was a
clear statement against the system of trial upon personal knowledge of
the jurors.
During the period of the inquisitorial system of trial the concept of a
witness as a witness of the party did not distinctly emerge. Until there
were witnesses in the modem sense, there could be no reason for the idea
that a party was bound by his witness or that he could not impeach him.
Even then in civil cases, although it became common for parties to produce witnesses during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, the cases
do not show any statement of the impeachment rule. During this time
there was still no occasion for the rule in criminal trials as the accused was
not allowed to have any witnesses during the Sixteenth Century."2 By the
middle of the Seventeenth Century the use of witnesses for the accused
became common 3 but it was not until 1695 that he could have them testify under oath even in prosecutions for treason. Furthermore, it was not
until that year that the accused had the right of counsel in trial for treason
and in trials for felony, not until 1836.4 But for the most of this period
the idea still persisted that a criminal prosecution was not an adversary
proceeding.' s As the change from the inquisitorial to the adversary system came in criminal cases, we first find the courts declaring that the
accused can not impeach his own witnesses. The rule was extended to
civil cases and then extended to the prosecution. It conforms to the ancient idea in connection with compurgation, although this procedure had
but little relationship to the new mode of trying facts. It naturally fits into the emerging adversary theory of litigation. It became a part of the
law without being subjected to close scrutiny as the earlier cases did no
more than state the rule. In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
when the courts began to feel the necessity of justifying accepted rules
upon rational grounds, they endeavored to lend respectability to the doctrine and to place limits upon its application.
"4 Maule & S. 532 (i816).
Throckmorton's Trial, i How. St. Tr. 869, 885 (I554); Udall's Trial, i How. St. Tr. 1271,
1280, 1304 (I590).
'3 Faulconer's Trial, 5 How. St. Tr. 323, 357 (1653); Hawkins' Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 921
933 (1669).
14 1 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note i, at §§ 575, 2190.
is Plunket's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 447, 496 (i68i).
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The two criminal cases in which the rule makes its first reported appearance were decided in i68i, approximately a century after wager of law had
dropped into disuse. In Fitzharris'Trial,the accused was informed that he
should not disparage his own witnesses and that he could not attempt to
obtain a self-contradiction of an unwilling witness. 6 In Coolidge's Trial,
Lord Chief Justice North said:
Look you Mr. Coolidge, I will tell you something for law and to set you right.
Whatsoever witnesses you call, you call them as witnesses to testify the truth for you;
if you ask them any questions you must take what they have said as true ....let
him answer you if he will but you must not afterwards go to disprove him.7

The earliest civil case upon the subject is apparently Adams v. Arnold,
wherein Holt, C.J., "would not suffer the plaintiff to discredit a witness
of his own calling, he having testified against him."' 8 In the latter part of
the Seventeenth Century, the rule was given further impetus by its use in
the trial of Warren Hastings,19 in which the prosecution was denied the
right to examine a witness produced by it as to prior declarations inconsistent with the answer of the witness. In Rex v. Oldroyd2° a new angle of
the question arose when the judge examined a witness whom the prosecution expressed unwillingness to call as she was suspected of being an accomplice. The judge, observing her testimony to favor the accused, had her
deposition before the coroner read for the purpose of affecting her credit.
When presented for the opinion of the judges it was held proper that the
judge admit the contradictory deposition, and Lord Ellenborough and
Mansfield, C. J., thought the prosecution had the same right.2 In Ewer v.
Ambrose" it was held error to admit a contradictory statement as substantive evidence. Judges Bayley and Holroyd thought it should not be
admitted to discredit the defendant's own witness, but Judge Littledale
considered it unnecessary to decide the question. In the leading case of
Wright v. Beckett 3 the plaintiff was allowed to show that his witness who
,6 8 How. St. Tr. 223, 369, 373 (68z).

'7

8 How. St. Tr. 549, 636 (i681).

18
12 Mod. 375, 90 Eng. Rep. IO64 (W7OO).
'9 Warren Hastings' Trial, Lords' Journal, Feb. 9, April io, 3I Parl. Hist. 369 (1788). See
2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note i, at §§ 896 (5), 905 n. I.
20Russ. & Ry.88 (I8o3).

"1In accord with this view, see State v. Slack, 69 Vt. 486, 38 Atl. 311 (1897); Litsinger v.
U.S., 44 F. (2d) 45 (C.C.A. 7 th 1930); Morris v. State, ioo Fla. 85o, I30 So. 582 (1930);
448, 171 N.E. 540
Carle v. People, 200 Ill. 494, 66 N.E. 32 (1902); People v. Rotello, 339 Ill.
(i93o); but cf. People v. Krejewsky, 332 Ill. 120, 163 N.E. 438 (1928).
"3 B. & C. 746 (x825).
231 Moo. & Rob. 414, 418 (x834). Lord Denman held similarly in Dunn v. Aslett, 2 Moo.
& Rob. 122 (1838).
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gave adverse testimony had related the facts differently to his attorney
before trial. When the point was later argued before Denman, L.C.J.,
and Bolland, B., opposite views were expressed. Lord Denman gave an
able opinion in support of the admission of the impeachment testimony,
but Baron Bolland held against it, regarding Rex v. Oldroyd24 not in point,
and considering Ewer v. Ambrose' as settled precedent. The English
6
courts in later cases uniformly rejected the views of Lord Denman.2
7
stated that he had
Baron Parke, in Holdsworth v. Mayor of Dartmouth,2
never doubted the opinion of Baron Bolland if the fact sought to be impeached were raised in examination in chief. Justices Erskine,' 8 Patterson,2 9 Wightman3° and Dr. Lushington"z in different cases expressly rejected all efforts of a party to impeach his own witness. The last development before the English Common Law Procedure Act 3 ' is found in the
case of Melhuish v. Collier, 3 in which it was held that a party might examine his own witness upon prior contradictions, not with the view of discrediting him, but of refreshing his recollection and of getting the witness
to correct himself. The court distinguished this procedure from calling
other witnesses to testify that the witness made the statements which he
denies. In 1854 legislation in England brought the law back to the earlier
position of Lord Denman, with the unfortunate exception that impeachment by proof of prior contradiction is permitted only when the judge is
34
of the opinion that the witness is adverse.
The development of the English law is duplicated in American law with
the courts vacillating upon the rule, quite generally establishing it, and
24 See

note 20 supra.

See note 22 supra.
26His opinion had great influence, however, in obtaining legislative reform in England. It
was set out at length in the Second Report of the Common Law Commissioners of England in
x853 which resulted in partial removal of the inhibition. See pp. i5-ig of this report.
27 2 Moo. & Rob. i53 (1838).
2s

28 Regina v. Ball, 8 C. & P. 745 (I839), on which Erskine, J., said, ".....

you cannot call a

witness,*or give evidence not otherwise admissible, for the purpose of discrediting your own
witness." Also Winter v. Butt, 2 Moo. & Rob. 357 (1841).
29Regina v. Farr, 8 C. & P. 768 (839).
30 Allay v. Hutchings, 2 Moo. & Rob. 358 (1841).

3'The Lochlibo, 14 Jur. 792, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 645 (185o). In this case the use of prior inconsistent statements was held objectionable because it permitted indirectly what a party
could not do in a straightforward way, namely, to discredit his witness by general evidence.
32 17 and 8 Vict. c. 125, § 22 (1854). See note 83 infra.
33

15 Q.B. 878,

117

Eng. Rep. 69o (i85o).

34 For extensive discussion of all legislation dealing with the impeachment rule, see pp.

88-96 infra.
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then proceeding to qualify it, with varying degrees of success. The problem first appeared in this country in the North Carolina case of State v.
Norris," in which the court permitted impeachment by showing the witness' contradictions, but without citing any authorities. The court stated:
Were not the solicitor allowed to impeach such evidence, a wide door would be open
for acquittal of the prisoner by false testimony; the prisoner would have nothing
more to do than cause his witnesses to be introduced on the part of the state. They
might therefore pass for truth any falsities they might think proper to utter.
Shortly afterward, the rule of that state was changed, reaching the same
result as the English cases. 36 In New York the exclusion was early established and still continues3 7 In the federal case of Ellicott v. Pearl,38 in
which an explanatory report of a survey was rejected for use of impeaching a party's witness, judge Story said:
But, in truth, the evidence was offered to discredit in part his present testimony;
and certainly, the demandants were not at liberty to discredit their own witness, by
showing his former declarations upon the same subject; though they might show by
other witnesses that he was mistaken.
The tendency in this country generally has been to accept the rule but
enlarge the possibilities of self-impeachment. 39 The doctrine of surprise
has developed, which permits a party to interrogate his own witness to
obtain self-contradiction.4° Some courts have gone further and admitted
independent proof of inconsistent statements where a party has shown
4
that he was surprised, misled or deceived by the adverse testimony. '
The Illinois Appellate Court adopted this more liberal view in the case of
3s

i Haywood (N.C.)

36 Sawrey

v. Murrell,

429,
2

1 Am. Dec. 564 (1796).

Haywood (N.C.) 397 (i8o6); State v. Taylor, 88 N.C. 694 (1883).

Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 301 (183o); Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N.Y. 230 (1873);
People v. Purtell, 243 N.Y. 273, 153 N.E. 72 (1926); see Holtzoff, The New York Rule as to
Impeachment by a Party of His Own Witness, 24 Col. L. Rev. 715 (1924). For discussion of
the recent legislative proposal in New York, see pp. 91-96 infra.
38 io Pet. (U.S.) 412, 44o (1836).
37

39 Hurley v. State, 46 Ohio St. 320, 21 N.E. 645 (I889); Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N.Y. 230,
231 (1873); State v. Wolfe, iog W.Va. 59 o , 156 S.E. 56 (1930); Stanley v. Sun Ins. Office,
126 Neb. 205, 252 N.W. 807 (1934); Alabama Power Co. v. tKall, 212 Ala. 638, 1o3 So. 867
(1925); Sullivan v. U.S., 28 F. (2d) 147 (C.C.A. 9th 1928); Note, Am. Cas. 1914 B, I120-35.

4oIbid.
4r Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56 N.W. 58 (1893); Hurlburt v. Bellows, 5o N.H. o5
(1870); Murphy v. State, 120 Md. 229, 87 At. 811 (1913); People v. Payne, 131 Mich. 474,
91 N.W. 739 (1902); Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. 362, 102 Pac. 57 (i909); Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597 (i885); George v. Triplett, 5 N.D. 5o, 63 N.W. 891 (1895); State v.
D'Adame, 84 N.J.L. 386, 86 AtI. 414 (ig3); Schmeltz v. Tracy, rig Conn. 492, 177 Atl.

520 (1935).
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National Syrup Co. v. Carlson,42but little use has been made of it in application. Other decisions place Illinois among the states adhering to the
common law principle of exclusion. 43 The movement in our law to liberalize the right of impeachment follows the course which the English law
was taking in the case of Melhuish v. Collier44 with the idea of surprise
usually engrafted upon it4 Decisive action uprooting the rule from its
obscure but secure past has not been generally undertaken by courts or
legislation. The most liberal tendencies have been at best conservative,
and have sustained the principle of the rule, founded upon its a prioriconceptions, without searching and testing its merits as a practical device for
obtaining just decisions of causes in the course of litigation.
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The prohibition against impeaching one's own witnesses has been justified by the courts on two grounds: (a) a party by calling and examining a
witness thereby vouches for and guarantees him to the triers of fact; (b)
if a party were permitted to impeach the witnesses whom he placed upon
the witness stand, he would be in a position to control their testimony.
The impeachment of a party's own witness by proof of prior inconsistent
statements has been said to be objectionable for the additional reason
that the jury might accept the impeachment testimony as proof rather
than use it only to test credibility. Are these reasons sound in theory or
in practice? Are they consistent with other rules of procedure? How do
they operate in actual litigation?
A. VOUCHING FOR A PARTY'S WITNESSES

The cases upon the subject of a party's right to impeach his own witness

are replete with statements as a reason for the rule that a party who offers
a witness thereby represents him as worthy of belief." A typical expression of this reason for the rule is contained in the statement of judge
Rowell in the case of Cox v. Eayres in which he says:
It seems to be pretty generally conceded that a party cannot impeach his own witness by general evidence of his bad character for truth; and the reasons given for the
4242

Ill. App. I78 (i891). See also Consolidated Coal Co. v. Seniger,

T79

Ill. 370, 53 N.E.

733 (899).
43 Chicago City R. Co. v. Gregory, 221 11. 59x, 77 N.E. 1112 (Io6); People v. Johnson,
o
314 Ill. 486, 145 N.E. 703 (1924); People v. Michaels, 335 Ill. 59 , 167 N.E. 857 (1929).
44 15 Q.B. 878, 117 Eng. Rep. 690 (85o), supra note 33.
45See notes 40, 4x supra.

46Becker v. Koch, 104 N.Y. 394, io N.E. 701 (1887); Wilson v. Prettyman, i95 Iowa 598,
192 N.W. 413 (1923); People v. Johnson, 314 Ill. 486, 145 N.E. 703 (1925); State v. Wolfe,
1o9 W.Va. 590, 156 S.E. 56 (193o); Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 421 (4 th ed. 1935); 3
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rule are, that by offering a witness in proof of his case, a party thereby represents him
as worthy of belief, and that thereafter to attack his general character for truth,
would be not only bad faith towards the court, but in the language of Buller,47 "would
enable the party to destroy the witness if he spoke against him, and to make him a good

witness if he speaks for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his credit if he
speaks against him."48

Other common expressions used in the statement of this reason are that
the party vouches for his witness or that he has guaranteed him. 49 This
reason has been indiscriminately applied both to cases in which the impeachment attempted was by proof of general evidence of character to
attack veracity, and to those in which the method of proposed impeachment was the proof of prior inconsistent statements. s° In either situation,
however, the doctrine that a party guarantees his witness cannot be sustained upon rational grounds. There are two principal ideas back of the
theory. The first is that a party is regarded as selecting his witnesses,
which may have its root in the history of compurgation. The second idea
is that a party sponsors what his witness says and this lies in the general
theory of our modern adversary system of trial. The chief fault in the
vouching theory lies in the lack of free choice in the selection of witnesses.
There is a vital distinction between oath-takers and witnesses both in selection and function. Except in the case of character witnesses and expert
testimony, parties under the adversary system do not choose any persons
they might like to place upon the witness stand, but are forced to take
those, good or bad, who by fate or chance happen to have been exposed
to the opportunity of observing or hearing facts which pertain to the case
on trial. s' Even a person choosing a course of life with the most exacting
precautions is likely to find it necessary to call witnesses who are the least
desirable when he has his day in court. The error of the vouching theory
Wharton, Criminal Evidence §1389 (rith ed. 1935); i Greenleaf, Evidence § 442 (x866);
2

Wigmore, op. cit. supra note i, at § 898.
47

Trials at Nisi Prius 297 (1767).

4 55 Vt. 24, 27

(1883).

49 See

note 46 supra.

so For critical discussion on this point see Taylor, Evidence §§ 1047-49 (1848) Contra,
Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56 N.W. 58 (1893). The courts which have broken away from

the impeachment rule have done so only as to impeachment by prior inconsistent statements,
interest, corruption, and bias. Mr. Wigmore in commenting on the deductions from the vouching theory says, "If the party is to be taken as guaranteeing the witness' credibility, clearly
he is prohibited from exposing, by any means whatever, an error of that witness, and especially an error which carries with it an implication of other errors, from whatever source."
2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note i, at § 902. This statement emphasizes the need for complete
abolition of the rule.
s, Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56 N.W. 58 (1893); see May, Some Rules of Evidence,
ii Am. L. Rev. 264 (x876).
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is most apparent where the adverse party is called as a witness. The rule
is ineffective to exclude the prior inconsistent statements of the adverse
party because they are admissible as admissions. 52 The courts, however,
still hold that the party who produces his adversary as a witness vouches
for his veracity and shall not be allowed to show him unworthy of credit
generally. 53 The unreasonableness of the doctrine is disclosed in the case
of Webber v. Jackson, in which the plaintiff put the defendant upon the
stand for the purpose of proving fraud under a judgment creditor's bill.
Against the impeachment rule the court pointedly said, "But it seems a
little incongruous to claim that a party who puts the defendant upon the
stand for the express purpose of showing his fraud, thereby gives him
54
credit for honesty."
The courts have uniformly rejected the idea that a party vouches for
witnesses whom he is under a duty to call.5s In a very real sense, with the
exception of experts and those who testify as to character, most witnesses
are necessary from the standpoint of the party. Indeed, in the case of
technically necessary witnesses, the proponent often exercises choice in
advance. Comparatively, the ordinary witness more nearly fits a rational
classification of necessary witnesses. There is a distinction, in that the
law places no duty upon him to call the particular witness as in the case
of a necessary witness, but if he expects to present his case at all in court,
he must select those available or have none.
From another aspect the vouching theory fails to take into account the
inability of a party to select witnesses whose testimony he may predict
with certainty. Jeremy Bentham, in his attack upon the vouching theory
stated that it rests upon the false axiom that:
All men belong to one or the other of two classes-the trustworthy and the untrustworthy. The trustworthy never say anything but what is true: by them you
can never be deceived. The untrustworthy never say anything but what is false: so
6
sure as you believe them, so sure are you deceived.s

52People v. Michaels, 335 Ill.
590, x67 N.E. 857 ('929);-Lambert v. Armentrout, 65 W.Va
375, 64 S.E. 260 (i9o9); Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N.Y. 92, 87 N.E. 77 (199o).
53 Mississippi Glass Co. v. Franzen, 143 Fed. 5oi (C.C.A.
3 d 19o6); Bushnell v. Bushnell,
io3 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925); Royer v. Erb, 219 Iowa 705, 259 N.W. 584 (1935).
S4 79 Mich. 175, 179, 44 N.W. 59i, 592 (1890). See, under statute, Fleegar v. Consumer's
Power Co., 262 Mich. 537, 247 N.W. 741 (1934).
5sThompson v. Owen, 174 Ill.
229, 5i N.E. lo46 (i898); In re Estate of Warren, 138 Ore.
283, 4 P. (2d) 635 (193); State v. Slack, 69 Vt. 486, 38 Atl. 311 (1897) (holding that the State
in a criminal case may impeach its own witnesses on account of its obligation to bring forward
all witnesses irrespective of their character).
s62 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 64 (1827), quoted in 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra
note i, at 256.
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Common experience demonstrates that the truth may be misunderstood
by those presumably reliable, and that persons of questionable character
may, and perhaps most often do speak the truth. The use of either class
of witnesses should not carry the penalty of being denied the right to impeach them if false in their testimony.
This leads us to the second inquiry as to the extent to which a party,
by presenting a witness in court, sponsors what the witness says. The
theory that a party should be held to do so lies in our adversary system of
trial. Under the early inquisitorial system, the jurors, acting upon their
own knowledge or investigation, or hearing such witnesses as happened to
be present, did not look at the witnesses as being connected with the
parties. Under the adversary system, by which the parties on each side
present only the witnesses by whom they expect to sustain their case, it is
somewhat natural to regard the witnesses as belonging to the party who
calls them. The litigant is permitted to emphasize his strength, minimize
his own weaknesses and magnify the weaknesses of his opponent. Consistent with this scheme is the thought that a party vouches for the persons
he presents as witnesses although he may freely attack those of his
opponent.
The common law method of pleading gives some light upon the extent
to which the adversary system requires each party to investigate his case
in advance and make a final determination of the facts before trial. The
litigant was required to know with approximate certainty, in advance of
trial, what his proof would establish, and to state with nicety and exactness the issue upon which he expected to rest his case. The penalty for
variance was severe. The same particularity was demanded in the older
criminal law indictments. This detailed investigation by the parties prior
to trial exacted under the early law accords with the notion that the parties should be held to guarantee their witnesses.
Later, the rules of pleading became more flexible and more adaptable
to the necessity of the parties who were unable to know in advance of
trial just how their evidence would develop. 7 Plaintiffs were allowed to
state their cause of action in several counts, and defendants were permitted to make inconsistent pleas. Permission was granted to allow
amendments during trial to make the pleadings conform to the proof.
The modern method of code pleading was designed to eliminate the exs7 Clark, Code Pleading 314 (1928); Shipman, Common Law Pleading 2o3-6 (Ballantine
ed. 1923); Stephen, Pleading 73-75, 166, 81 (Williston ed. 1895); Pomeroy's Code Remedies
§§ 447-449, 456, 457 (5 th ed. 1929); Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure, c. 5 (1922); Thompson, Trials §§ 2310, 2312 (2d ed. 1912).
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treme exactness required in the early law. Likewise the present day indictment is a totally different instrument than in the past. From this
great change in pleading, it is apparent that under the adversary system
the law has definitely recognized the inability of a party to know in advance what his proof will be, and the gross unfairness which would result
if he were compelled to rely only upon the facts as known by him before
trial.
These devices by which parties are permitted greater freedom in pleading reveal that the adversary theory has given way in those places where
its application would work a demonstrable injustice. Likewise, in connection with the impeachment rule, the adversary theory of trial has yielded
to the right of a party to impeach his own witness in the case of necessary
witnesses58 Also, it defeats its object if it compels a party to keep essential proof from the triers of fact. Therefore, it has not prevented contradiction by other witnesses.5 9 It has partially opened the way for impeachment by permitting examination of the witness himself for the purpose of
refreshing his recollection and inducing him to tell the truth.6° It has also
permitted impeachment of a witness whom a party called, but from whom
he obtained no material testimony.6' It is illogical to hold that a party
vouches for his witnesses when under the adversary system he could not
effectually guarantee them if he desired to do so.62 It is reasonable to require all possible preparation in advance of trial but it is an unjustifiable
extension of the theory to deny a party the right to attack a witness from
whom investigation indicated favorable testimony would be given. As the
adversary theory has gradually conformed to the demands of reality and
has recognized the inability of a party to predict with accuracy what his
testimony will be in advance, it is time that it should carry this principle
to the repudiation of the vouching theory which has resulted in a denial
of the right of a party to impeach his own witnesses.
B. CONTROL OF WITNESSES

Mr. Justice Buller's statement quoted by Judge Rowell suggests that
the power to impeach involves the power to destroy.1 Mr. Wigmore elaborates it thus:
s8 See note 55 supra.
s9 Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Camp. 555 (i81i); Lewis v. Wabash R. Co., 142 Mo. App. 585,
S.W. iogo (i909); Olmstead v. Winsted Bank, 32 Corn. 278 (1864); Chicago City Ry. Co.
v. Gregory, 221 Ill. 591, 77 N.E. 1112 (igo6).
6oSee note 39 supra.
61 Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson, i58 N.Y. X5o, 52 N.E. io59 (i899).
121

62 Selover

v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56 N.W. 58 (1893).

63See text to note 48 supra.
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The true foundation of policy (so far as there is any) is here manifest. If it were
permissible, and therefore common, to impeach the character of one's witness whose
testimony had been disappointing, no witness would care to risk the abuse of his character which might be launched at him by the disappointed party. This fear of the possible consequences would operate subjectively to prevent a repentant witness from
recanting a previously falsified story, and would more or less affect every witness who
knew that the party calling him expected him to tell a particular story ..... Specula-

tive as this danger may be, it furnishes the only shred of reason on which the rule
may be supported.4
There is no indication that Bentham received such an impression from
Buller's statement, and in the earlier cases no emphasis is put upon the
potential threat of coercion. Does it have any basis in fact?
How fearful persons on the witness stand may be of impeachment is a
matter of much conjecture. The witness on the stand is, of course, in a
position of public obervation, holding the center of attraction of jury,
court and courtroom. What he says or does, and what happens to him in
the battle between attorneys, are matters of comment and are liable to be
heralded in the newspapers. If inconsistencies of a witness' statements
were permitted to be shown, although involving no moral degradation, they
might sometimes be embarrassing and become an injury to his self-esteem.
If proof is permitted of contradictory statements which he denies having
made to others, the witness may be made to appear either muddle-headed
or a falsifier. If his moral character is attacked his life becomes an open
book, exposed for public comment. Psychologists speak of the personal
ego as one of the dominating characteristics in human behavior. Pride of
opinion, self-esteem, and the desire to be thought well of are as a matter
of common experience recognized as factors significant in shaping the
conduct of people, and these human characteristics are accentuated in the
courtroom. How does this relate to the theory that the power to impeach
a witness whom a party calls gives the power to control his testimony?
. Impeachment by Bad Character
We will first consider the operation of the rule prohibiting impeachment
by evidence of bad character. The fear theory of the impeachment rule
assumes that a witness would testify falsely, for the party who calls him,
to avoid being subjected to the foregoing consequences of impeachment.
Restricting impeachment by the party who called him to testify is supposed to assure freedom of the bad witness to become honest and to make
it easy for him to testify to the truth. The need of the rule to accomplish
this result must be judged from the relation of the witness to the counsel
642 Wigmore, op. cit. supranote i,

at § 899.
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in charge of the case because it is through the counsel that the coercion
would be exercised. If we assume the counsel is honest it is difficult to see
any occasion for the rule upon this ground. If the witness knew his character were bad and knew the law, he could inform the counsel in advance
of trial of the facts as he knew them, and it is inconceivable that an honest
counsel would attempt to coerce the witness into stating the facts favorable to his cause by threats of impeachment. Thus there is an available
and simple means of attaining the same result without the use of the impeachment rule. If we assume that the witness is ignorant either of his
own bad character or of the law, again there would be no occasion for the
rule to operate. The witness would not be conscious of the danger which
he might encounter and therefore the rule designed to assure him freedom
in giving testimony could have no effect upon him.
The operation of the fear theory seems to require a dishonest counsel
who presents a witness whom he knows does not want to testify as expected
and the counsel uses the whip of impeachment to hold the witness to the
expected testimony. For the witness to be put in fear, he would need
to know that his character was regarded as bad, and believe that the
counsel intended to use it to impeach him if he failed to testify as expected.
The witness would need to feel that nothing could be gained by informing
the counsel of the true facts in advance of trial because he would call him

-

to testify anyway and would employ the threat of impeachment to coerce
his testimony. Such a situation seems improbable both from the standpoint of the attorney and of the witness who would yield to such actual or
implied threats. Furthermore, if the dishonest counsel knew in advance
that the witness did not believe the facts which were expected from him,
and did not desire to testify, he would not be safe in using the witness, as
he could not know whether the danger of impeachment would in fact
cause the witness to falsify in his favor. The rule is not generally considered upon specific tests of its operation but is judged upon the principle
of coercion as an abstract conception. Here the rule likewise fails because
it overlooks another factor, namely that the counsel for the adverse party
might impeach the witness by the means held not available to the party
who called him. The witness would be escaping impeachment only from
one of the parties. If he assumed that by giving false testimony he would
avoid impeachment by the party who called him, he most surely ought to
expect impeachment by the opposite party who would be justified in doing
so. This point would seem to rebut conclusively the control theory as
applied to general character evidence. Furthermore, the control theory
ignores the danger that the witness might be charged with perjury, which
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would have a forceful counteracting influence against the fear of being
impeached.
ii. Impeachment by Interest and Bias
The control theory of the impeachment rule has little or no opportunity
to operate in the case of impeachment byinterest, hostility, or bias, as these
qualities involve no degradation of the witness.6s The very elements of the
hostility or interest repudiate the opportunity for the theory to operate,
as they show the disposition of the witness not to yield to the wishes of the
party who called him. There is one situation, however, in which this may
not be true. In case the attempted impeachment by bias disclosed disgraceful conduct, the witness might seek to avoid the embarrassment by
giving favorable but false testimony. However, it is important to realize
that if the counsel for the other side of the case had called the witness, the
same impeachment would be available. The coercion by the adversary
would then be quite as efficient as if the adversary had called the witness
as his own. Yet the law permits this impeachment of the witnesses called
by an opponent. The only effective means of preventing the coercive influence of impeachment by proof of disgraceful conduct would be to
eliminate that type of impeachment altogether.
in. Impeachment by Corruption

In the case of impeachment by corruption, similar principles would
apply as in the case of impeachment by evidence of bad character, with
the exception that the range of use of such proof is more limited. If the
corruption had been in the interest of the party calling the witness, he
would hardly be in a position to impeach the witness by it.
If the witness had been corrupt in suborning testimony for the party's
adversary, it could not be reasonably expected that the witness would
give favorable testimony on the other side. The very fact of corruption in
favor of an adversary notifies the counsel that he can not look for favorable testimony from the witness. This method of impeachment is more
generally usable against an adversary's witness, rather than by the party
6s Cases on application of the rule upon interest and bias are not numerous and are in conflict. See Fairly v. Fairly, 38 Miss. 280 (1859); In re Mellen's Estate, 56 Hun (N.Y.) 553,
9 N.Y.S. 929 (189o); O'Rear v. Manchester Lumber Co., 6 Ala. App. 461, 6o So. 452 (1912).
In Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mayo, 134 Ala. 641, 33 So. 16 (1902), it was held that by
the general rule that one may not impeach his own witness, he may not show that the witness
is insane. But in State v. Alexander, 89 Kan. 422, 131 Pac. 139 (1913), the prosecution was

permitted to prove that one of its witnesses was drunk at the time of observing the facts about
which he testified. Likewise in State v. Lee, 85 S.C. io, 67 S.E. 141 (igo), it was held that
the rule did not apply to evidence showing that the witness for the state was the putative
father of the accused.
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who calls him. However, assuming the control theory might operate in
favor of a party who called the witness, it would also operate to control
the witness if he had been called by the adversary, yet impeachment in
this instance is permissible. The situation in which impeachment by corruption does aid a party in testing the credibility of his own witness is
shown in the case of State v. Moon,' in which the witness before trial had
informed the prosecution of the statements made by the defendant of his
plans concerning a larceny. When called and examined, he denied knowledge of these statements. The prosecutor was allowed to cross-examine
the witness about them after which the witness was arrested for perjury.
The next day the witness called for the prosecuting attorney, changed his
statement, and when placed upon the witness stand retold the original
story and gave the details in respect to subornation by the defendant
which had caused him to testify falsely. Mr. Wigmore in his comment
upon the opinion upholding the procedure says, "It is a brilliant example
in repudiating the artificial trammels of the present rule." 67 It should be
observed that in this case there could be no opportunity for the control
theory to operate because the witness could not have expected the prosecutor to have known of the corruption. Witnesses would conceal such facts
from the party who called them, which would prevent them from fearing
that the party would use the proof of corruption against them. Thus the
coercion theory would fail to operate.
Iv. Impeachment by Inconsistent Statements
We will next consider the operation of the fear theory in connection
with impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. For the principle to
operate, it is necessary to assume that the first story is incorrect and that a
penitent witness desires to recant and give true testimony when called in
court. The fear theory assumes that the witness would not do so if he
knew it were possible to prove that he had made a former contradictory
statement. Again we must consider the matter from the standpoint of the
honest and the dishonest counsel. If the witness realized that he had made
the former statement by mistake and he informed the counsel of this fact
before trial, an attorney acting in good faith would not call upon him to
testifr. The witness, therefore, could avoid the experience of being impeached in a much easier manner than by giving perjured testimony. If
the witness, however, did not inform counsel of the mistake before trial
but changed his story upon the witness stand, the consequences of impeachment by this method could not be serious. There is nothing dis6671

Kan. 349, 8o :Pac. 597 (1905)-

67 2

Wigiore, op. cit. supra note i, at § 9oi n.
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graceful about being mistaken and the witness would have the opportunity of correcting and explaining his former statement.
If we assume a dishonest counsel or an attorney who did not believe
that the witness was telling the truth, it is possible that he would endeavor to use this method of impeachment to bring the statements into the
case although the witness previously informed him of their error. This,
however, could not operate to coerce the witness. A dishonest counsel
might claim that the former statement was true and that the witness falsified when he changed his story although the counsel believed otherwise.
The fact that the witness himself admitted the former statement would
tend to nullify the effect of this accusation. A candid explanation on the
part of the witness would make it difficult for an unscrupulous attorney
to disparage the witness unduly and could easily prejudice the attorney in
the eyes of the jury. There is hardly a slight possibility of coercion by the
use of prior inconsistent statements; surely not enough to make application of the control theory plausible.
v. The False Premise of the Control Theory
The chief fault of the control theory as applied to all types of impeachment lies in the fact that it assumes that all witnesses who give destructive
testimony to the party who calls them, are testifying to the truth. Unfortunately the rule has been most often regarded as prohibiting the impeachment of a penitent witness, who previously told a false story and desires to
recant and state only what is true, or of a witn~ss who is being compelled
to testify falsely under the pressure of having his bad reputation exposed
if he does not do so. The first story told, surely in many cases and likely
in most cases, represents the truth, or at least an uncertainty which should
call into question the correctness of testimonial divergence in court. When
it is considered how many influences might be brought to bear to make a
witness change his story, objections to the rule may be appreciated. 68
Sympathy for the accused in criminal cases plays a large part in causing
witnesses to change their testimony, as many people dislike to take an
active part in causing imprisonment, particularly when friends or relatives
are involved. The paying-off process in the form of reparation of the loss
is often potent in persuading prosecuting witnesses to repudiate their
former statements and to develop an attitude favorable to the defense.
Bribery also is a significant factor in causing witnesses to change stories
at the trial, in both civil and criminal cases. Threats of physical violence,
control by gang domination, and the fear among some witnesses of being
68 See also, Hurlburt v. Bellows, So N.H. 105 (1870); Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56
N.W. 58 (1893).
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disrespected and ostracised for turning state's evidence weigh heavily in
preventing the truth from being told. The Association of Grand Jurors of
New York County in its program to abolish the impeachment rule, emphasized this aspect of the problem, stating:
Under the existing law in New York, the District Attorney cannot fight back when
the defendant tampers with his witnesses. One story may be told him in his office, and
an entirely contradictory one on the witness stand. The law will not allow him to expose the lie. Likewise the attorney for the defense who calls a witness is presumed, in
broad language, to vouch for his character and story and cannot impeach him. As a
result, in many criminal actions where terrorists are on trial, a witness who originally
gave the prosecutor information useful to the people repudiates his story through
fear.9
There is no sound basis for assuming that destructive testimony given by
a party's own witness is the truth told by a recanting witness, nor is there
a realistic foundation for the hypothesis that fear of impeachment dominates witnesses throughout their examination. The latter conception is at
best a fanciful psychological speculation, and could not appreciably
affect an honest and reputable witness, nor is it likely to react upon the
disreputable.70 As shown in the foregoing analysis, the sphere in which
the coercion doctrine may operate is very limited, and in most situations
could be avoided if the witness desired.
C. IMPEACHING EVIDENCE AS SUBSTANTIVE

A reason frequently urged in support of the impeachment rule is the
danger that the jury may accept the impeaching statements as substantive proof.7' This could, of course, apply only in the attempt to impeach
by proof of prior inconsistent statements. Also, no legitimate purpose of
impeachment can be served by introducing prior statements against a
witness who has given no damaging evidence. The courts have discussed
this problem at length, uniformly holding the testimony inadmissible as
12

69Wright, 1935 Legislative Program of Association of Grand Jurors of New York County,
The Panel 25, 26 (1934).
7o2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note i, at § 899; May, op. cit. supranote 51.

2x Alabama Power Co. v. Hall, 212 Ala. 638, io3 So. 867 (1925); Ewer v. Ambrose, 3 B. & C.
746 (1825); Langford v. Jones, x8 Ore. 307, 22 Pac. io64 (x89o); Katz v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. R.
629, 245 S.W. 242 (1922); State v. Gardner, 135 La. 746, 66 So. 18i (1914); Best, Evidence
§ 440 (1849); Taylor, Evidence § io48 (1848); 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supranote i, at §§ 903, 904

(8), ioi8; Jones Evidence § 853 (3d ed. 1924). The objection to the use of impeachment evidence as independent proof is well recognized. Donaldson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,
188 Mass. 484, 74 N.E. 915 (19o5). Most of the cases, however, which assert this objection
as ground for prohibiting impeachment of a party's own witness deal with the single problem of
excluding ex parte statements by a witness who has given no damaging proof in court, and
which would thus have no impeachment value. See note 72 infra.
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hearsay.7 2 The problem is presented only when a witness gives destructive
testimony to the party who calls him, and has previously made favorable
declarations to the contrary. Is the danger of use by the jury as substantive evidence a valid objection to the right of impeachment?
Upon three grounds this reason for the rule can not be sustained. First,
the application of this theory is inconsistent with the accepted doctrine
that a counsel may obtain an admission from his own witness that he has
made contradictory statements. In case a party shows that he is surprised
by the unfavorable testimony, he may make inquiry of his witness concerning prior statements, to refresh his memory, to probe his conscience,
and to permit him to explain his divergencies if he admits them.7 3 If the
witness admits making the former statement but maintains that it is not
correct, the statement is nevertheless before the jury just as the impeachment statement would be. The danger of receiving the contradiction as
proof would be the same as if other witnesses proved the former state4
ment.7
Second, the inconsistent application of this reason pointedly appears in
connection with impeachment of witnesses of an adversary. The identical
chance of misuse of impeaching statements exists where the witness has
damaged the proponent as where the witness had damaged the opponent.
Yet in the latter case prior inconsistent statements are universally admitted without fear that the triers may accept the impeaching statements as substantive evidence.
Third, the suggestion of Mr. Wigmore7s that the hearsay rule be held
inapplicable to ex parte statements of a witness who is in court, may be
profitably employed to refute this reason for the impeachment rule. The
fact that the witness is present in court, sworn upon oath, and subjected
to cross-examination of the adverse party, substantially eliminates the
opportunity for error or misjudgment in receiving the former statement.
Although the prior statements are technically hearsay every condition is
met, which otherwise calls for the exclusion of such testimony. If there is
no real danger, even assuming the jury were to accept the prior inconsistent statements as proof, that reason for the rule can not be urged
where there is a legitimate basis of admitting the statements for impeach72Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac. Xo99 (1922); Kun v. United States, 24 F. (2d)
910 (C.C.A. 9th 1928); Sullivan v. U.S., 28 F. (2d) 147 (C.C.A. 9th 1928); People v. Spencer,
58 Cal. App. 197, 208 Pac. 380 (1922).

7SState v. Wolfe, iog W.Va. 59o, 156 S.E. 56 (193o), and note thereto, 74 A.L.R. io39
(1930).
7 State v. D'Adame, 84 N.J.L. 386, 86 At. 414 (1913).
7S2 Wigmore, op. dct. supra note i, at § ioi8.
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ment purposes. Fortunately the impeachment rule has been avoided
where the adverse party is called as a witness, because the prior statements are received as admissions. Clearly as to non-party witnesses, evidence of former statements ought to be admitted with instructions by the
court, limiting its use to impeachment, the same as in innumerable places
in the law of evidence, proof is admitted with limitations upon the right
of the jury to consider it.
LEGISLATION LIBERALIZING THE IPEACHMENT RULE

The statutes modifying the common law rule prohibiting a party from
impeaching his own witness have an interesting history, commencing with
the English act of 1854, and concluding with the recent legislative reform
proposed in New York eighty-one years later. The English act is usually
thought of as the first enactment upon the subject and as having been the
general pattern for subsequent statutes appearing in Anglo-American
countries. Other acts are usually described in respect to their similarity
to or difference from the English act. As a matter of fact, the Scotch law
was amended three years before the English act to permit impeachment
of any witness, including thereby a party's own witness, by proof of prior
contradictions, and it was not bound up with the limitation that the witness prove adverse. 76 And peculiarly enough the English act did not
originate in England, but was borrowed in great part"7 from the Report
of the Commissioners on the New York Code of Civil Procedure7 8 which
was submitted to the New York legislature and bears the date of December 31, 1849. The sections of the report upon which the English act is
based never became a part of the law of New York. The impeachment
rule continues in full force in that state, in spite of {he diligent efforts for
law reform urged before the legislature last year. A bill changing the rule
was presented by the Commission on Administration of Justice, and was
761852 Act. i5 & 16 Vict., C. 27, III.
77 Taylor, Evidence § 1282 n. i (2d ed. x855); Id. at § 1426 n. (a) (12th ed. 1931). This
note states that the enactment was taken from the New York Civil Code but these provisions
were in the Commissioners' Report only and were not enacted.
78Commissioners' Report, New York Code of Civil Procedure § 1845 (1849). The party
producing a witness, is not allowed to impeach his credit by evidence of bad character but he
may contradict him by other evidence, and may also show that he has made at other times,
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, as provided in section 1848. Sec. 1848. A
witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before this can be done, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstancei of times, places and persons present; and he must be
asked whether he has made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing, they must be shown to the witness, before any question is put to him
concerning them.
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sponsored by the Association of Grand Jurors of New York County as a
part of their 1935 Legislative program. 9 The bill was passed upon the
floor of the Senate but was never reported out of the Judiciary Committee
of the AssemblyY° It has met the same fate so far as did the attempt in
1849 to remedy the evils of the common law rule. The new measure, however, is materially different from the earlier one, is much broader in its
provisions, and presents the first comprehensive treatment of the problem.8' The bill will undoubtedly be urged again, and the success of its
enactment is quite probable.8 2 The former report of the Field Commission
has had great influence in this country through the indirect method of the
English act and quite possibly by direct reference because the legislation
in the United States corresponds more nearly with the Field proposal than
with the English law. This, however, could have been done as well by
practical and natural modification of the English act as by taking the
New York proposal which, by not being adopted, lost much of its prominence.
Unfortunately the English act was very limited in its scope and at most
but partially opened the way to impeachment by prior inconsistent statements of a party's own witness. The act at first applied only to civil proceedings but in 1865 was extended to all courts of judicature, civil and
criminal. The form of the English act is confusing, but in substance it
provides8 3 that a party producing a witness in court:
(I) shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence of bad character,
(2) may contradict him by other evidence,
(3) may prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony, provided,
(a) the witness prove adverse in the opinion of the judge,
(b) leave of the judge be obtained by counsel,
(c) a foundation for impeachment is laid.

In the Canadian Provinces this statute was uniformly adopted verbatim
or in substance8 4 Four American states, Florida, New Mexico, Vermont,
79 Recommended Changes in Practice, Procedure and Evidence, Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State, p. 61, § 38; Wright, 1935 Legislative Program of
Association of Grand Jurors of New York County, 12 The Panel 25, 26 (1935).
so Greene, 1935 Legislative Program Results, 13 The Panel 3, 7 (1935).
81See text to note ioo infra.
82See note 8o supra.
83 x7 & 18 Vict. c. 125, § 22 (1854): "A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to
impeach his credit by general evidence of bad character; but he may, in case the witness shall
in the opinion of the judge prove adverse, contradict him by other evidence, or by leave of the
judge prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony.)
84 Wigmore, Evidence § 905 nn. 2, 3 (2d ed. 1923, supp. 1934).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

Virginia (and Hawaii) have statutes in substance identical to the English
Act.8 In the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure the elements of both
hostility and surprise are included, and it is further provided that surprise
does "not arise out of the mere failure of the witness to testify as expected,
but out of his testifying upon some material matter against the party
introducing him and in favor of the opposite side."8' 6 In the District of
Columbia there is a statute permitting a party to impeach his own witness
by proof of prior inconsistent statements in event of surprise with the included proviso that if the statements are made to a party or his attorney
before the trial, the requisite element is met.8 ' This position is similar to
that of the federal and some state courts without statute but gives more
assurance for the reception of independent proof of the impeachment
statements. Georgia" and the Philippine Islands19 have likewise adopted
the surprise theory in their statute but by different language, the former
making the condition of a party's right to impeach his own witness that
he be "entrapped" and the latter that he be "misled" by the witness.
The Massachusetts statute 90 represents the legislation in ten states,9'
Alaska, 92 and Porto Rico. 93 It reads as follows:
The party who produces a witness shall not impeach his credit by evidence of bad
character, but may contradict him by other evidence, and may also prove that he has
made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony [foundation
for impeachment required].94
In the case of Ryerson v. Abington decided in the same year that the
statute was enacted in Massachusetts, the court said in reference to the
8SFla. Comp. Gen. L. 1927, § 4377; N. Mex. Ann. Stats. 1929, c. 45, § 607; Vt. Pub. L.
§ 1702; Va. Code 1930, § 6215 (with additional provision that court shall instruct the
jury not to use the prior statements except for purpose of impeachment). Hawaii Rev. L.
1933,

1925, § 2624.

8

6Louisiana Code Crim. Proc.

87 D.C.

Code

1932, §§ 487, 488.

1929, tit. 9,§ 2X.

Ga. Code 1933, § 5879. The provision first appears in I861.
9Philippine Islands, Code Civil Proc. 1901, § 340.
9oMass. Gen. L. 1932, c. 233, §§ 22, 23.
88
8

§ 4186; California Code Civ. Proc. X931, § 2049; Idaho Code 1932, c.i6,
1933, c. 2, § 1926; Carroll's Ky. Code 1932, § 596; Mont. Rev. Stat.
1921, § io666; Ore. Code 1930, c. 9, § i909; Texas Code Crim. Proc. 1928, § 732; Wyo. Rev.
Stat. I93 I,c. 89, § 17o6.
92 Alaska Comp. L. 1933, § 1499.
91Ark. Dig.

1921,

§ 1207; Burns' Ind. Stats.

9' Porto Rico Rev. Stat. x911, §§ 1524, 6275. The requirement that the party be surprised
and the witness prove adverse has been read into the statute, People v. Plata, 36 P.R. 530
(1927).
94 See

note 87 supra.
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statute, 95 "It is taken almost verbatim from the English statute ....
omitting however the qualification of the act-'in case the witness shall in
the opinion of the judge prove adverse'-and the limit of the right to prove
such inconsistent statements 'by leave of the judge' only." The Massachusetts statute may have come from the English act, but it has a striking
similarity to the Field Commission Report of 1849,96 which is believed to
be the true source of all legislation upon the subject prior to the recent
New York proposal.
The exact origin of our legislation upon this subject is interesting, in
that it discloses the common tendency to copy statutes or first proposals,
rather than make an independent investigation of the merits and sufficiencies of proposed remedies. The earlier legislation stopped far short of
an adequate treatment of the problem by dealing only with impeachment
by prior inconsistent statements. The serious objection to it is the failure
to admit other impeachment, which, if regarded by the law as worth
while for testing the truth of an adversary's proof, would serve in the
main the same purposes of exposing falsity and error in the case of a
party's own witnesses.
THE PROPOSED NEW YORK LEGISLATION

The proposal of the Commission on the Administration of justice in the
State of New York recognizes and attempts to cure the defects and limitations of previous legislation pertaining to the impeachment rule. Whereas
all former legislation has expressly prohibited the impeachment of the
witness of a party by proof of his general character and has enlarged admissibility only to the extent of authorizing proof of prior inconsistent
statements, the New York proposal has attempted to deal with all principal methods of impeachment. It is by far the most comprehensive and
carefully drawn measure upon the subject, and anticipates most of the
problems with much nicety. Its provisions are as follows:
The party who calls a witness shall not be precluded from impeaching him by proof
of prior contradictory statements or by evidence of bias or corruption, or in any other
manner, except that the party calling the witness shall not be permitted to prove the
bad reputation of the witness for truth and veracity, or to prove that he was convicted
of a crime unless such proof is offered prior to or at the beginning of the examination
95 102 Mass. 526, 530 (1869). Before the act the Massachusetts lawfollowed the rigid common law rule. See Adams v. Wheeler, 97 Mass. 67 (1867). The Massachusetts courts have not
read into the statute the surprise or adverse element, but permit impeachment when injurious
testimony is given. Brooks v. Weeks, 121 Mass. 433 (1877).
96For text of report, see note 78 supra.
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of the witness or unless the court is satisfied that such bad reputation or conviction was
discovered by the party subsequent to the witness' giving his testimony.97
The first part of the proposal, it will be observed, accomplishes all that
is done under the Massachusetts and English statutes and more. It opens
the way for a party to prove prior contradictory statements of his own
witness, which is the total accomplishment of all previous legislation. It
is not fettered with requirements that the witness be adverse or that the
party be surprised. In this it is like the Massachusetts type of statute. It
also contains the additional provision that the party producing a witness
may impeach him by evidence of bias or corruption. The English act requires that the witness prove adverse in order to permit his prior contradictory statements to be introduced. The New York proposal contemplates the admission of proof of those things which make the witness adverse for the direct purpose of impeachment, rather than as a condition to
the introduction of previous contradictions. It provides for broad construction in this respect because it contains a supplemental phrase permitting impeachment "in any other manner" subject to specified exceptions. The whole tone of the proposed act is different from former legislation, which explicitly permitted only proof of prior contradictory statements to escape from the inhibition invoked by the common law.
The New York proposal is the first attempt to admit impeachment of a
party's own witness by proof of general reputation for credit, and the
previous conviction of a crime. The common law has been firmly set
against such proof upon the theory early expressed by Judge Buller that a
party should not be able to make beneficial use of the testimony of a witness generally unreliable if the witness prove favorable, but be permitted
to blacken his character if the testimony turned out to be against him. 98
This position is not without merit. The ostensible unfairness of being
willing to withold what the party knew about the witness until his testimony was given and then, if it turned out to be bad, to attack his general
character, makes a strong appeal for excluding this testimony. The result,
however, of the common law in making a positive exclusion of this testimony often puts a party in a difficult position. If the witness proves favorable he will be attacked by his opponent, and if the witness is damaging, he is helpless to expose him. The party is always in danger of suffering
97Recommended Changes in Practice, Procedure and Evidence, Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State, p. 6i, § 38, Proposed Section 343-a of the Civil Practice Act. Also appears in Report of the Commission on Administration of Justice in New
York State 299 (i934).
98Trials at Nisi Prius 297 (1767).
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the ill effects of having the adverse party put him in the position of having
produced an unreliable witness, and yet he is not in a position to make a
similar disclosure. The problem thus presented is how to deal fairly with
the party and also have the party deal fairly with the court. This matter
is disposed of in the New York proposal by making it possible for a party
who produces a witness whose character is subject to attack to introduce
such proof at the beginning of the examination or at a later time if he did
not have knowledge of those facts when the witness was first examined.
The bill does not prevent such proof, but it requires that if a party is going
to use it, he must do so when his witness gives favorable testimony as well
as when he gives objectionable testimony.
This part of the proposed statute generally meets all objections which
might be urged in support of prohibiting proof of general character. The
coercion theory is dispensed with because the party has done all he could
do to injure the witness before he has testified upon the facts of the case.
The guarantee theory is dispensed with because the party discloses at the
outset that he is not guaranteeing the witness but is showing his objectionable character so that the jury may have that testimony in evaluating the
proof upon the facts in issue. Theoretically the proposed statute is sound,
and works practically, in the case of impeachment by previous conviction
of crime. This phase of the problem had been presented in the New York
case of Peoplev. Minsky, in which the prosecutor called a witness whom he
knew to be adverse and opened the examination by disclosing his bad
criminal record. The New York court, upholding the procedure, said:
The district attorney put her on the stand as a hostile witness to get what he could
from her. By so doing he did not necessarily present her as a witness of good moral
character. The law does not limit a party to witnesses of good character, nor does it
compel a party to conceal the bad record of his witnesses from the jury, to have it
afterwards revealed by the opposing party with telling effect. Such a rule would be
unfair alike to the party calling the witness and the jury. Men have been convicted
of murder in the first degree by the evidence of admittedly dangerous and degenerate
witnesses, law-breakers and professional criminals ..... But when a disreputable
witness is called and frankly presented to the jury as such, the party calling represents
him for the occasion and the purposes of the trial as worthy of belief. 9
In respect to proof of previous conviction of a felony, there is no difficulty
involved in the requirement that a party disclose this fact before introducing evidence upon the issues. But in the case of proof of general character,
there is a practical difficulty which would prevent a successful operation
of the New York bill. It is easy,enough to disclose the record of one having
99 227 N.Y. 94, 98-99, I24 N.E. 126, 128 (1919). See also, Vause v. U.S., 53 F. (2d) 346,
351 (C.C.A. 2d i93i). Compare Labrie v. Midwood, 273 Mass. 578, 174 N.E. 214 (1931).
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been convicted of a felony, as the witness would ordinarily prefer telling
this fact for the party who calls him, rather than admit it upon crossexamination. It is then more in the nature of sustaining than impeaching
evidence. But upon the issue of general credit, it might be impossible to
show bad reputation by the witness himself, and it is not feasible to call
other witnesses to testify about it before examining the witness. The result is that, upon the subject of proof of reputation for truth and veracity,
the effect of the New York proposal is practically to deny it. Assuming
that the bad reputation of a witness is shown by other witnesses, it would
be most unusual psychologically, to be able at that time to obtain helpful
testimony from the witness. This phase of the bill thus results in no more
than to permit the party who produces a witness to disclose facts known
by the witness about his own character which the witness will admit.
Only in event that the bad reputation of the witness was not known at the
time of examining the witness can it be shown after examination. The proposed New York act has the salutary objective of requiring a party who
knows the faults of his witness to disclose them before he knows what his
testimony will be, rather than wait and disclose them only if the witness
turns out to be against him. The only question is its practicality in opening the way to full impeachment.
COMPLETE ABROGATION OF THE COMMON LAW RULE

Whether the New York proposal has gone far enough in the renewal
of the inhibition of the common law rule is questionable. The intent of the
sponsors has undoubtedly been that it would do more than its functional
operation may prove possible. They have assumed the ability to impeach successfully the general credit of the witness by the party who calls
him, before he testifies. As has been pointed out, the use of bad character
evidence, except as the witness makes his own disclosure, is practically
ruled out as a usable impeachment device. This raises the question whether the legislation should provide generally that a party may impeach his
own witness in the same manner and under the same circumstances as he
may impeach the witness of his adversary. Mr. Wigmore favors the complete abolition of the common law rule.1°° The report of the Committee of
the Commonwealth Fund in 1927, commenting upon the rule, stated that
"The rule prohibiting impeachment of one's own witness .... has no
shadow of good sense in any of its parts."' O The gist of the theory favoring the limitation imposed by the New York plan is the assumed unfair'Do2 Wigmore, op. cit. supranote i, at §§ 896-904.
l0x
Report of the Committee of the Commonwealth Fund, The Law of Evidence-Some
Proposals for its Reform, xvi, n. 1 (1927).
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ness of counsel when he presents a witness, knowing his reputation is bad,
and then fails to disclose it if he gives favorable testimony. This would be
the result of an open door rule, and yet would allow the party to discredit
the witness if his testimony were unfavorable. The New York limitation
penalizes party and counsel, by precluding impeachment when disclosure
is not first made. In doing so, has it impaired just decisions of causes in
our courts by preventing the fact of the witness' character from being
known when the party who calls the witness is then the only one who
would make the disclosure of bad character? It should be observed that
the impeachment rule at common law has not prevented parties from
presenting objectionable witnesses and accepting their beneficial testimony without disclosing their bad character. Parties have only had to
gamble on the chances that the testimony would be favorable. The rule
has only prevented showing bad character when the testimony is destructive. Usually the opponent adequately takes care of attacking the character of the witness when the testimony is beneficial if the occasion calls
for it. If the party were allowed to impeach his own witness when he has
given destructive testimony it would merely give him the same right which
the opponent has when the testimony is helpful. The New York bill emphasizes the good faith element by requiring the party himself to disclose
the bad character of his own witness whether his testimony be favorable
or not, if he wishes to raise the character issue. May an opposite position
be justified? This brings us again to Bentham's idea that good men may
sometimes falsify and bad men may generally tell the truth, and that there
is no fixed category into which all mankind can be placed under all circumstances and at all times. Is it not an incongruous situation which is
apparently required for a party to be fair under the New York hypothesis,
namely that he expose the bad reputation of his witness after he has given
favorable testimony which the party producing him believes is the truth?
It is very much questioned that a party should be compelled to be the one
to produce evidence upon the character of his own witness, when the
technical position in which he is placed is considered, and it can hardly be
said that it is unfair for him not to do so. Furthermore, the opponent
might find it indiscreet to attack the character of a witness in situations
in which he was obviously telling the facts honestly. The point is simply
that there are occasions in which a party might be willing to rely upon the
testimony of a generally undesirable witness, if his testimony were true,
without exposing his bad character, but if the witness gave false testimony he would feel that he ought to expose it." °
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From another angle, these same factors would tend to curb abuse of
this type of impeachment by a party of his own witness. The ostensible
impropriety of a party in calling a witness and impeaching him if he testified against him, would naturally cause attorneys to be hesitant in using
this method of impeachment. If counsel abused the privilege of using
character testimony, he would pay the price with the jury, who might
resent too much of such procedure. This is true in the case of the use of
general character evidence against the witness of. an adversary, an a
fortiori in the case of a party's own witness. Excessive use of impeachment would be checkmated by its own dangers.
The proposed New York act represents such an advanced step in legislation upon the subject, and is so well supported by good propriety, that
it is to be strongly commended. It is surely preferable to all former acts,
but hardly accomplishes all that is desired. It apparently assumes that it
has opened the door of impeachment wider than it in fact has. It also involves distinctions, and opens the way to fact determinations (such as
whether or not the party knew the witness' character before he testified),
which may permit unnecessary appeals and reversals. A more simple form
of legislation, which would dispose of the entire problem, is suggested as
follows:
No party shall be precluded from impeaching a witness because the witness is his
own.
This would eliminate all confusion, and the troublesome distinctions
which give rise to litigation upon the subject, where statutes but partly
remove the inhibition. The restraint upon impeachment of a party's own
witness has burdened the courts from the Sixteenth Century to the present day. The courts have shown their dislike for the rule by a gradual
process of distinction and qualification which is characteristic of the existence of an unwise rule of law. It is doubtful that the rule could have endured long, if it were not for the ingenuity of both courts and lawyers, in
escaping its rigid application wherever possible. The piecemeal process of
partial elimination of a rule fundamentally unsound but promulgates the
principle as an heirloom of past centuries. While commending the progress
of legislation, and particularly the advancement of the New York proposal, it is believed that better results would be obtained by complete abolition of the rule.

